The underlying property, its definition and representation play a major role when monitoring a system. Having a suitable and convenient framework to express properties is thus a concern. Such a framework should permit to represent properties which can be verified during the runtime of a system. It is desirable to delineate in this framework the spaces of properties for which runtime verification approaches can be applied to. We revisit the safety-progress classification of properties in a runtime verification context. Firstly, we characterize the set of properties which can be verified (monitorable properties) and enforced (enforceable properties) at runtime. Secondly, for the delineated spaces of properties, we obtain specialized monitors both for monitoring and enforcement.
Introduction
Runtime verification [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] is a verification method aiming to ensure that a given system meets a desirable property. In runtime verification, a run of the system under scrutiny is analyzed incrementally using a decision procedure: a monitor. This monitor can generated from a user-provided high level specification. The aim of the monitor is (only) to detect violation or validation wrt. the given specification or property. That is, while processing an execution sequence (step by step) of the monitored program, it produces a verdict (a truth value taken from a truth domain) indicating property fulfilment (or violation). In other words, a monitor is a state machine with an output function, producing verdicts for the sequences fed by an underlying program. The major part of research endeavor was done on the monitoring of safety properties, as seen for example in [6, 7] . However, the authors show in [8] that safety properties are not the only monitorable properties. Recently, a new definition of monitorability was given by Pnueli in [2] and it has been proved in [4] than safety and co-safety properties represent only a subset of the space of the monitorable properties.
possible to enforce at runtime more than safety properties. Using a more powerful enforcement mechanism called edit-automata, it is possible to enforce the larger class of infinite renewal properties, able to express some kinds of obligations used in security policies. More than simply halting an underlying program, edit-automata can also "suppress" (i.e. freeze) and "insert" (frozen) actions in the current execution sequence. In [13] and [14] , we have proposed extensions of runtime enforcement wrt. the safety-progress (SP) classification of properties. In [13] we have shown how to synthesize an enforcement monitor from a Streett automaton. Later, in [14] we have characterized a lower bound of the set of enforceable properties: response properties.
Motivations and contributions. From a broad view, the main objective of this paper is to provide a clear characterization of the space of properties which can be verified and enforced at runtime. Notably we aim to precisely determine on which properties the runtime verification and enforcement techniques can be applied wrt. a general classification. This also helps to understand how the enforcement approach is related to the (more generic) verification one. The classification under consideration is the safety-progress (SP) hierarchy [15, 16] , which provides an alternative and finer-grain characterization compared to the more classical safety-liveness dichotomy [17, 18] . To the authors' knowledge, there is no exact and precise characterization of which properties can be validated with monitoring techniques. Previous works in areas of runtime verification and enforcement provide lower-bounds for the spaces of properties which can be addressed by those techniques. This paper characterizes exact bounds of the spaces of monitorable and enforceable properties. In this paper we are also providing, in this safety-progress context, a general and unified framework for both domains. This framework allows us to specify properties from several views and in a uniform way. It will allows us to compare which properties can be addressed by each technique (verification or enforcement) and point out precise differences. Moreover, we specify two general and generic notions of monitors (one for runtime verification and the other for runtime enforcement). In the context of the SP classification, we define transformations which allow us to synthesize such monitors from Streett automata.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sect. 2 introduces some preliminary notations used throughout this paper. Sect. 3 overviews related works to the issues addressed in this paper. In Sect. 4 we present the safety-progress classification of properties in a runtime verification context. Sect. 5 is dedicated to the study of the space of monitorable properties, while Sect. 6 studies the enforcement one. In Sect. 7 we present the synthesis of runtime verification and enforcement monitors. We give some concluding remarks and future works in Sect. 8.
Preliminaries and notations
This section introduces some preliminary notations, namely the notions of program execution sequences and program properties.
Sequences, and execution sequences
Sequences and execution sequences. Considering a finite set of elements E, we define notations about sequences of elements belonging to E. A sequence σ containing elements of E is formally defined by a total function σ : I → E where I is either the interval [0, n − 1] for some n ∈ N, or N itself (the set of natural numbers). We denote by E * the set of finite sequences over E (partial function from N), by E + the set of non-empty finite sequences over E, and by E ω the set of infinite sequences over E. The set E ∞ = E * ∪ E ω is the set of all sequences over E. The empty sequence of E is denoted by E or when clear from context. The length (number of elements) of a finite sequence σ is noted |σ| and the (i + 1)-th element of σ is denoted by σ i . For two sequences σ ∈ E * , σ ∈ E ∞ , we denote by σ · σ the concatenation of σ and σ , and by σ ≺ σ the fact that σ is a strict prefix of σ (resp. σ is a strict suffix of σ). The sequence σ is said to be a strict prefix of σ ∈ Σ ∞ when ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , |σ| − 1} · σ i = σ i and |σ| < |σ |. When σ ∈ E * , we note σ σ def = σ ≺ σ ∨ σ = σ . For σ ∈ E ∞ and n ∈ N, σ ···n is the sub-sequence containing the n + 1 first elements of σ. Also, when |σ| > n, the subsequence σ n··· is the sequence containing all elements of σ but the n first ones. For i, j ∈ N with i ≤ j, we denote by σ i···j the subsequence of σ containing the (i + 1)-th to the (j + 1)-th (included) elements.
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A program P is considered as a generator of execution sequences. We are interested in a restricted set of operations the program can perform. These operations influence the truth value of properties the program is supposed to fulfill. Such execution sequences can be made of access events on a secure system to its ressources, or kernel operations on an operating system. In a software context, these events may be abstractions of relevant instructions such as variable modifications or procedure calls. We abstract these operations by a finite set of events, namely a vocabulary Σ. We denote by P Σ a program for which the vocabulary is Σ. The set of execution sequences of P Σ is denoted by Exec(P Σ ) ⊆ Σ ∞ . This set is prefixclosed, that is ∀σ ∈ Exec(P Σ ), σ ∈ Σ * · σ σ ⇒ σ ∈ Exec(P Σ ). In the remainder of this article, we consider a vocabulary Σ.
Properties
Properties as sets of execution sequences. A finitary property (resp. an infinitary property, a property) is a subset of execution sequences of Σ * (resp. Σ ω , Σ ∞ ). Considering a given finite (resp. infinite, finite or infinite) execution sequence σ and a property φ (resp. ϕ, θ), when σ ∈ φ, noted φ(σ) (resp. σ ∈ ϕ, noted ϕ(σ), σ ∈ θ, noted θ(σ)), we say that σ satisfies φ (resp. ϕ, θ). A consequence of this definition is that properties we will consider are restricted to single execution sequences 1 , excluding specific properties defined on powersets of execution sequences (like fairness, for instance). Moreover, for a finitary property φ and an execution sequence σ ∈ Σ ∞ , we denote by Pref ≺ (φ, σ) the set of all (strict) prefixes of σ satisfying φ, i.e. Pref ≺ (φ, σ) = {σ ∈ φ | σ ≺ σ}. The longest prefix of σ satisfying φ (noted Max(Pref ≺ (φ, σ))) is the maximal element regarding ≺ if Pref ≺ (φ, σ) = ∅. Given a property φ ⊆ Σ * and an execution sequence σ ∈ Σ * , a straightforward property of the set
The verificationa and enforcement mechanisms we aim to define will run with the underlying program under scrutiny, it should be able to decide about the truth value of the formula regarding the current produced execution sequence. The principle of analyzing execution sequence at runtime restricts the kind of property our monitors can analyze. Indeed, the analysis of runtime execution monitor is, by definition, restricted to one execution sequence. Such a fact implies that the security automaton cannot decide about property involving several executions of the monitored program. An example of such a kind of property is for instance a fairness property.
Runtime properties. In this paper we are interested in runtime properties. As stated in the introduction, we consider finite and infinite execution sequences (that a program may produce), runtime verification properties should characterize satisfaction for both kinds of sequence in a uniform way. As so, We introduce r-properties (runtime properties) as pairs (φ, ϕ) ⊆ Σ * × Σ ω . Intuitively, the finitary property φ represents the desirable property that finite execution sequences should fulfill, whereas the infinitary property ϕ is the expected property for infinite execution sequences. The definition of negation of an r-property follows from definition of negation for finitary and infinitary properties. For an r-property (φ, ϕ), we define (φ, ϕ) as (φ, ϕ). Boolean combinations of r-properties are defined in a natural way. For * ∈ {∪, ∩}, (φ 1 , ϕ 1 ) * (φ 2 , ϕ 2 ) = (φ 1 * φ 2 , ϕ 1 * ϕ 2 ). Considering an execution sequence σ ∈ Exec(P Σ ), we say that σ satisfies
Evaluation of r-properties. Monitorability, enforceability, and monitor synthesis are based on the evaluation of r-properties. Evaluating an execution sequence wrt. a r-property consists in producing a verdict regarding the current property-satisfaction of the sequence or future satisfactions of possible continuations. The considered verdicts here are truth-values taken from a truth-domain. A truth-domain is a lattice, i.e. a partially ordered set with an upper-bound and a lower-bound. Considering a truth-domain B, a r-property Π and an execution sequence σ, the evaluation of σ ∈ Σ * wrt.
, is an element of B depending on Π(σ) and satisfaction of continuations of σ (i.e. {σ ∈ Σ ∞ | σ ≺ σ }) wrt. Π. • negatively determined by σ, if θ(σ · µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ ∞ (finite or infinite).
• positively determined by σ, if θ(σ · µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ ∞ (finite or infinite).
• σ-monitorable, if there exists a (finite) µ ∈ Σ * s.t. θ is positively or negatively determined by σ · µ.
• monitorable, if it is monitorable for every σ ∈ Σ * .
The idea is that it becomes unnecessary to continue the execution of a θ-monitor after reading σ if θ is not σ-monitorable. The intend of [2] was to characterize when it is worth monitoring a property.
Monitorability in the sense of [4] : Bauer and al. inspired from Pnueli's definition to propose a slightly different definition of monitorable properties based on the notion of good and bad prefix introduced in model-checking [19] . The intuitive idea is that with monitorable properties it is possible to "detect" finite violation or validation of infinitary properties with finite sequences. Considering an infinitary property ϕ ⊆ Σ ω , a prefix σ is said to be a bad prefix, noted bad prefix (σ, ϕ) (resp. good prefix, noted good prefix (σ, ϕ)) of ϕ if ∀w ∈ Σ ω · ¬ϕ(σ · w) (resp. ∀w ∈ Σ ω · ϕ(σ · w)). Then, a prefix σ is ugly if it has no good nor bad continuation, i.e. ∃v ∈ Σ ω · bad prefix (σ · v, ϕ) ∨ good prefix (σ · v, ϕ). Finally, a property is said to be monitorable if it does not have ugly prefix, formally:
Previous characterization of monitorable properties: Bauer and al. have shown that, according to this definition, the set of monitorable properties is a strict super set of safety and co-safety properties. These classes of properties are taken from the classical safety-liveness classification of properties [18, 17] . In the SP classification, the class of co-safety properties is the guarantee class. They also gave an example of request/acknowledge property which is not monitorable. Such a property can be framed in the set of response properties wrt. the SP classification (see Sect. 4.
Runtime enforcement (enforceable) properties
In [10] , the authors proposed a classification of enforceable properties with the regard of a program as a Turing machine. Their purpose was to delineate the set of enforceable properties according to the mechanism used for the enforcement purpose. Properties are classified according to the modification the enforcement mechanism can perform on the underlying program. Notably each employed mechanism corresponds to a certain (computability) class of property.
• Properties enforceable by static analysis of the underlying program. These are decidable properties on the underlying program.
• Properties enforceable by runtime execution monitor. These are co-recursively enumerable properties.
• Properties enforceable by program rewriting. The set of enforceable properties depends on the equivalence relation used between programs. Concurrently, other works [9, 11, 12, 20, 14] focused on particular runtime enforcement monitors and proposed a characterization of enforceable properties with those mechanisms.
Property enforcement by an EM is usually defined as the conjunction of the two following constraints:
• soundness: the output sequence should satisfy the underlying property;
• transparency: the input sequence should be modified in a minimal way, namely if it already verifies the property it should remain unchanged (up to a given equivalence relation), otherwise its longest prefix satisfying the property should be issued.
Security automata and decidable safety properties: Schneider introduced security automata (a variant of Büchi automata) as the first runtime mechanism for enforcing properties in [9] . The set of enforceable properties with this kind of security automata is the set of safety properties. Then [10] Schneider, Hamlen and Morisett refined the set of enforceable properties and shown that these security automata were in fact restrained by some computational limits. Indeed, Viswanathan [11] noticed that the class of enforceable properties is impacted by the computational power of the enforcement monitor. As the enforcement mechanism can implement no more than computable functions, the enforceable properties are included in the decidable ones. Hence, they showed in [10] that the set of safety properties is a strict superior limit to the power of (execution) enforcement monitors defined as security automata.
Edit-automata and infinite renewal properties: Ligatti and al. [12, 20] introduced edit-automata as runtime execution monitors. Depending on the current input and its control state, an edit-automata can either insert a new action by replacing the current input, or suppress the current input. The properties enforced by edit-automata are called infinite renewal properties: it is a superset of safety properties and contains some liveness properties (but not all). Then a property θ is said to be an infinite renewal property
Generic runtime enforcer and response properties:
In [14] we introduced a generic notion of EM emcompassing previous mechanisms and gave a lower-bound on the space of properties they can enforce in the SP classification (see Sect. 4).
Synthesis of monitors
For runtime verification: Generally, runtime verification monitors are generated from LTL-based specifications, as seen recently in [4, 21] . Alternatively, ω-regular expressions have been used as a basis for generating monitors, as for example in [8] . An exhaustive list of works on monitor synthesis is far beyond the scope of this paper. We refer to surveys [1, 3, 5] for a more exhaustive list.
For runtime enforcement: In [22] Martinell and Matteucci tackle the synthesis of enforcement mechanism as defined by Ligatti. More generally the authors consider security automata and edit-automata. The monitor is modelled by an algebraic operator expressed in CCS. The program under scrutiny is then a term Y K X where X is the target program, Y the controller program and K the operator modeling the monitor where K is the kind of monitor (truncation, insertion, suppression or edit). The desired property for the underlying system is formalized using µ-calculus. In [23] Matteucci extends the approach in the context of realtime systems. In [13] we define transformations for some classes of the safety-progress classification of properties. Those transformations take as input a Streett automaton recognizing a property and produce a generic enforcement monitor for this property.
The SP classification of properties in a runtime context
This section revisits the safety-progress classification of properties introduced by Manna and Pnueli in [15, 16] . This classification introduced a hierarchy between properties defined as infinite execution sequences. We extend the classification to deal with finite-length execution sequences. As so, we consider r-properties which are suitable to express runtime properties. This hierarchy presents properties in a uniform way according to 4 views: a language (seeing properties as sets of sequences), a logical (seeing properties as LTL formulas), a topological (seeing properties as open or closed sets), and an automata view (seeing properties as Streett automata [24] ). We only present the results about the language and automata views as needed
for ongoing discussions in this paper. A graphical representation of the safety-progress classification of properties is depicted on Fig. 3 . Further details and results can be found in [25] .
The language-theoretic view of r-properties
The language-theoretic view of the SP classification is based on the construction of infinitary-properties and finitary-properties from finitary ones. It relies on the use of four operators A, E, R, P (building infinitary properties) and four operators A f , E f , R f , P f (building finitary properties) applying to finitary properties. In the original classification, operators A, E, R, P, A f , E f were introduced. In this paper, we add operators R f and P f and give a formal definition of all operators by inspiring from the definition of their infinite variants R, P . Let ψ a finitary property over Σ.
• A(ψ) consists of all infinite words σ s.t. all prefixes of σ belong to ψ.
• E(ψ) consists of all infinite words σ s.t. some prefixes of σ belong to ψ.
• R(ψ) consists of all infinite words σ s.t. infinitely many prefixes of σ belong to ψ.
• P (ψ) consists of all infinite words σ s.t. all but finitely many prefixes of σ belong to ψ. Formally
Operators A f , E f , R f , P f build finitary properties similarly:
• A f (ψ) consists of all finite words σ s.t. all prefixes of σ belong to ψ.
• E f (ψ) consists of all finite words σ s.t. some prefixes of σ belong to ψ.
• R f (ψ) consists of all finite words σ s.t. ψ(σ) and there exists a continuation σ of σ also belonging to ψ.
• P f (ψ) consists of all finite words σ belonging to ψ s.t. there exists an extension σ of σ s.t. each extension σ of σ belongs to ψ.
Based on these operators, each class can be seen from the language view. DEFINITION 4.1 Let ψ be a finitary property, a r-property Π = (φ, ϕ) is:
• A safety r-property if Π = (A f (ψ), A(ψ)). All prefixes of a finite word σ ∈ φ or of an infinite word σ ∈ ϕ belong to ψ.
• A guarantee r-property if Π = (E f (ψ), E(ψ)). Each finite word σ ∈ φ or infinite word σ ∈ ϕ is guaranteed to have some prefixes (at least one) belonging to ψ.
• A response r-property if Π = (R f (ψ), R(ψ)). Each infinite word σ ∈ ϕ recurrently has (infinitely many) prefixes belonging to ψ.
• A persistence r-property if Π = (P f (ψ), P (ψ)). Each infinite word σ ∈ ϕ persistently has (continuously from a certain point on) prefixes belonging to ψ.
Yliès Falcone, Jean-Claude Fernandez, Laurent Mounier Obligation (resp. reactivity) r-properties are obtained by boolean combinations of safety and guarantee (resp. response and persistence) r-properties. For k ∈ N, a k-obligation (resp. k-reactivity) r-property is a r-property k i=1 (Safety i ∪ Guarantee i ), where Safety i and Guarantee i are safety and guarantee r-properties (resp. a r-property
, where Response i and Persistence i are response and persistence r-properties). The set of all k-obligation (resp. k-reactivity) r-properties for k ∈ N is the set of obligation (resp. reactivity) r-properties.
We note Safety(Σ) (resp. Guarantee(Σ), Obligation(Σ), Response(Σ), Persistence(Σ), Reactivity(Σ)) the set of safety (resp. guarantee, obligation, response, persistence, reactivity) r-properties defined over Σ. Moreover, a r-property of a given class is pure when it is a property of none of others classes.
The automata view of r-properties
For each class of the SP classification it is possible to syntactically characterize a recognizing automaton. We define a variant of deterministic and complete Streett automata (introduced in [24] ) for property recognition. These automata process events and decide properties of interest. We add to original Streett automata a finite-sequence recognizing criterion in such a way that these automata uniformly recognize r-properties.
relatively to a set of events Σ. The set Q is the set of automaton states, q init ∈ Q is the initial state. The function −→: Q × Σ → Q is the complete transition function. In the following, for q, q ∈ Q, e ∈ Σ we abbreviate −→ (q, e) = q by q e −→ q . The set {(R 1 , P 1 ), . . . , (R m , P m )} is the set of accepting pairs, for all i ≤ n, R i ⊆ Q are the sets of recurrent states, and P i ⊆ Q are the sets of persistent states.
We refer to an automaton with m accepting pairs as a m-automaton. When m = 1, a 1-automaton is also called a plain-automaton, and we refer to R 1 and P 1 as R and P . In the following A = (Q A , q init A , Σ, −→ A , {(R 1 , P 1 ), . . . , (R m , P m )}) designates a Streett automaton. For σ ∈ Σ ∞ , the run of σ on A is the sequence of states involved by the execution of σ on A. It is formally defined as run(σ, A)
The trace resulting in the execution of σ on A is the unique sequence (finite or not) of tuples (q 0 , σ 0 , q 1 ) · (q 1 , σ 1 , q 2 ) · · · where run(σ, A) = q 0 · q 1 · · · . The uniqueness of the trace is due to the fact that we consider only deterministic Streett automata.
Also we consider the notion of infinite visitation of an execution sequence σ ∈ Σ ω on a Streett automaton A, denoted vinf (σ, A), as the set of states appearing infinitely often in run(σ, A). It is formally defined as follows: vinf (σ, A) = {q ∈ Q A | ∀n ∈ N, ∃m ∈ N · m > n ∧ q = q m with run(σ, A) = q 0 · q 1 · · · }. For a Streett automaton, acceptance conditions (finite and infinite sequences) are defined using the accepting pairs. In the following definition, we recall how an execution sequence is accepted by a Streett automaton.
The hierarchy of automata. By setting syntactic restrictions on a Streett automaton, we modify the kind of properties recognized by such an automaton. Each class is characterized by some conditions on the transition function and the accepting pairs. For instance, a safety automaton is a plain automaton such that R = ∅ and there is no transition from a state q ∈ P to a state q ∈ P .
• A safety automaton is a plain automaton such that R = ∅ and there is no transition from a state q ∈ P to a state q ∈ P .
• A guarantee automaton is a plain automaton such that P = ∅ and there is no transition from a state q ∈ R to a state q ∈ R.
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• An m-obligation automaton is an m-automaton such that for each i in {1, . . . , m}:
-there is no transition from q ∈ P i to q ∈ P i , -there is no transition from q ∈ R i to q ∈ R i ,
• A response automaton is a plain automaton such that P = ∅,
• A persistence automaton is a plain automaton such that R = ∅,
• A reactivity automaton is any unrestricted automaton.
It is possible to link the syntactic characterizations on the automata to the semantic characterization of the properties they specify. This is stated by the following definition (transposed from the initial theorem mentioned in [15, 16] ). THEOREM 4.1 A r-property (φ, ϕ) is a κ-r-property iff it is specifiable by a κ-automaton, where κ ∈ {safety, guarantee, obligation, response, persistence}
Proof The proof of this theorem relies mainly on the proof done in [15] , and the associated technical report. It consists in showing that the acceptance criterion for Streett automata matches with the operators given in the language view.
Monitorable properties wrt. the SP classification
In this section we revisit and extend previous definitions of monitorability in the safety-progress classification of properties. In fact, the space of monitorable properties relies directly on the underlying truth-domain taken into consideration. We note MP B Σ , the space of monitorable properties with alphabet Σ and truthdomain B. Then, we propose an alternative definition of monitorability and delineate the new space of monitorable properties.
Previous monitorable properties wrt. the SP classification
The underlying objective of previous monitoring approaches was to detect infinitary property violation or validation with finite prefix. Under scrutiny is an infinitary property ϕ, and finite sequence σ read so far. Intuitively, previous approaches aimed to detect, with the knowledge of σ, a verdict for ϕ no matter what is the continuation of σ. It is not surprising that the cardinal of the truth-domain and its elements (the kind of the sought verdict) influence directly the space of monitorable properties.
With a truth-domain of cardinal 2. Early monitoring approaches focused on the detection of either property validation or property violation. That is, the underlying truth-domain is of cardinal 2. One truthvalue is used when the monitor does not have produced a verdict yet: truth-value ?. The other one is used when the sought detection has been achieved: truth-value (property validation) or ⊥ (property violation). When considering a truth-domain B 2 = {?, ⊥}, the aim is to detect property violation. Here the set of monitorable properties MP {?,⊥} Σ is the set of Safety(Σ) properties. When considering a truth-domain B 2 = { , ?}, the aim is to detect property validation. Here the set of monitorable properties MP { ,?} Σ is the set of Guarantee(Σ) properties.
With a truth-domain of cardinal 3. Previous definitions of monitorable [2, 4] properties match on Σ ω . The underlying truth-domain is of cardinal 3: B 3 = { , ?, ⊥}. It is possible to express those definitions uniformly way in the framework of r-properties, as follows.
DEFINITION 5.1 (MONITORABLE [2] r-PROPERTIES) An r-property (φ, ϕ) ⊆ Σ
* × Σ ω is said to be: • negatively determined by σ, if ¬(φ, ϕ)(σ · µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ ∞ (finite or infinite), i.e. ¬φ(σ · µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ * and ¬ϕ(σ · µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ ω .
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• positively determined by σ, if (φ, ϕ)(σ ·µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ ∞ (finite or infinite), i.e. φ(σ ·µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ * and ϕ(σ · µ) for all completions µ ∈ Σ ω .
According to this definition the set of monitorable properties is exactly the set of obligation properties.
The set of monitorable properties, with B 3 , is the set of obligation properties in the SP classification.
Proof Obligation r-properties are obtained by boolean combinations of safety and guarantee r-properties. For k ∈ N, a k-obligation r-property is a r-property k i=1 (Safety i ∪ Guarantee i ), where Safety i and Guarantee i are safety and guarantee r-properties. The set of all k-obligation r-properties for k ∈ N is the set of obligation r-properties.
The proof is in two stages.
• Obligation(Σ) ⊆ MP
B3
Σ . Let Π ∈ Obligation(Σ), then there exists k ∈ N s.t. Π ∈ k − Obligation(Σ). Then the proof relies on an easy induction and uses the following facts:
-Safety properties are monitorable. For all σ ∈ Σ * there exists a continuation µ s.t. a safety property is negatively determined by σ · µ.
-Guarantee properties are monitorable. For all σ ∈ Σ * there exists a continuation µ s.t. a guarantee property is positively determined by σ · µ.
-Union of a safety and guarantee properties is monitorable.
-Intersection of two monitorable properties is monitorable.
• MP B3 Σ ⊆ Obligation(Σ). Let consider Π ∈ MP B3 Σ . The proof relies on observing that the fact of being negatively determined corresponds to the safety part of Π. While being positively determined corresponds to the guarantee part of Π.
A new definition of monitorability
The interest of previous definitions of monitorability is due to two facts: the underlying truth-domain is 2-valued or 3-valued and the aim is the detection of verdict of infinitary properties. As noticed in [4, 3] , it seems interesting to investigate further the space of monitorable properties. Indeed, we consider truthvalue denoting "what happens if the execution stops here". We are now able to distinguish prefixes which evaluated previously to ?. In others words, we believe that finite sequences have sense on their own. And it may be interesting to attribute a verdict for these sequences. Following [3] we consider a 4-valued truth-domain B 4 = { , p , ⊥ p , ⊥}. The truth-value p (resp. ⊥ p ) denotes "presumably true" (resp. "presumably false") representing Π satisfaction if the program execution stops here.
DEFINITION 5.2 (NEW MONITORABLE r-PROPERTIES, MP
* , a r-property Π is said to be monitorable if it is possible to evaluate Π for all σ ∈ Σ * in the following way:
•
It is easy to see that with such definition, the set of monitorable properties is the set of Reactivity(Σ) properties. While recognizing a property with a Streett automaton, it is easy to see and determine, by a small computation on the set of states and accepting pairs, to which value a prefix of an execution sequence evaluates (see Sect. 7.1). In Sect. 7, we will use Streett automata to generate monitors.
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6 Enforceable properties wrt. the SP classification
For a property to be enforceable, we believe that it depends only on constraints that any mechanism satisfying soundness and transparency should follow. This will give us a characterization of enforceable properties independently from a particular definition of an EM. Also, the delineated space is consequently an upper-bound for any EM satisfying soundness and transparency constraints.
Enforcement criteria
In Sect. 3, we have seen that the proposed spaces of enforceable properties were delineated according to the mechanism used to enforce the properties. Such mechanisms obey the soundness and transparency constraints. We choose here to take an alternative approach. Indeed we believe that the set of enforceable properties can be characterized independently from any enforcement mechanism complying to these constraints. A consequence of transparency is that an r-property (φ, ϕ) will be considered as enforceable only if each incorrect sequence has a longest correct prefix. This means that any infinite incorrect sequence should have only a finite number of correct prefixes, as stated below. Thus we give two equivalent enforcement criteria for r-properties in a language-theoretic and automata views.
DEFINITION 6.1 (ENFORCEMENT CRITERION (LANGUAGE VIEW))
A r-property (φ, ϕ) is said to be en-
DEFINITION 6.2 (ENFORCEMENT CRITERION (AUTOMATA VIEW))
A r-property Π recognized by a Streett automaton A Π is said to be enforceable iff every maximal strongly-connected component of R-states contain (only) either P -states or P -states. Proof This proof relies on the computation of maximal strongly connected components [26] of a Streett automaton (SCCmax). The proof is in two stages.
(⇒) Let consider a SCCmax of A Π made of R-states. Suppose that there exists two states q, q in this SCCmax s.t. q ∈ P and q / ∈ P . As q and q are in a SCC, there exists a path from q to q and from q to q in A Π . then it would exists an infinite execution sequence σ s.t. the run of σ on A Π is made of infinite occurrences of q and q · As this SCCmax is made of R-states, σ is not accepted by A Π , i.e. ¬ϕ(σ). However σ as an infinite number of "good" prefixes: all prefixes s.t. the run ends in a R-state. This is contradictory with our initial assumption.
(⇐) Let consider σ ∈ Σ ω s;t. ¬ϕ(σ). As A Π recognizes Π, σ is not accepted by A Π . As A Π is a finite state automaton, the run of σ on A Π visits a last SCCmax infinitely often, it can be expressed:
Moreover, we know that ∀i ≤ j ≤ i + l · q j ∈ P ∨ ∀i ≤ j ≤ i + l · q j ∈ P .
-In the first case, the sequence σ is accepted by A Π (Def. 4.4):
vinf (σ, A Π ) ⊆ {q i , . . . , q i+l } ⊆ P .
-In the second case, the sequence σ is not accepted by A Π (Def. 4.3):
According to the finite-sequence acceptance criterion, since ∀c ∈ N, c ≥ k ⇒ q c / ∈ P ∧ σ ···c .
The set of enforceable r-properties is denoted EP Σ . Note also that an EM(Ops) will output the empty sequence in two distinct cases: either when is the longest correct prefix of the input sequence, or when this input sequence has no correct prefix at all 2 . Finally, since we have to deal with potentially infinite input sequences, the output sequence should be produced in an incremental way 3 : for each current prefix σ of the input sequence read by the EM, the current output o produced should be sound and transparent with respect to Π and σ. This means that deciding wether a finite sequence σ verifies Π or not should be computable in a finite amount of time (and reading only a finite continuation of σ).
Enforceable properties
We start first by proving that response properties (defined in Sect. 4) are enforceable and give an example of persistence properties not enforceable. Then we find that the set of response properties is exactly the set of enforceable ones. Proof Indeed consider a response r-property Π = (φ, ϕ) = (R f (ψ), R(ψ)) (Π ∈ Response(Σ)) and an execution sequence σ ∈ Σ ω . Let suppose that ¬ϕ(σ). It means that σ ∈ R(ψ), i.e. σ has finitely many prefixes belonging to ψ. Consider the set {σ ∈ Σ * | ∀σ ∈ Σ * , σ ≺ σ ≺ σ ⇒ ¬ψ(σ )}. This set is not empty as ¬R(ψ), let note σ 0 the smallest element regarding ≺.
A straightforward consequence is that safety, guarantee and obligation r-properties are enforceable. We prove that, in fact, pure persistence properties are not enforceable. An example of pure persistence r-property is Π = (Σ * · a + , Σ * · a ω ) stating that "it will be eventually true that a always occurs". One can notice that this property is neither a safety, guarantee or obligation property. Π is recognized by the Streett automaton A Π depicted on Fig. 1 (with acceptance criterion vinf (σ, A Π ) ⊆ P and P = {1}). One can understand the enforcement limitation intuitively with the following argument: if this property was enforceable it would imply that an EM can decide from a certain point that the underlying program will always produce the event a. However such a decision can never be taken by a monitor without memorizing the entire execution sequence beforehand. This is unrealistic for an infinite sequence. More formally, as stated in the previous section, an r-property (φ, ϕ) is enforceable if for all infinite execution sequences of the program when ¬ϕ(σ), the longest prefix of σ satisfying φ (Max ≺ (Pref (φ, σ) ) always exists. For the automaton of Fig. 1, the execution sequence σ bad = (a · b) ω exhibits the same issue. Indeed, the infinite sequence does not satisfy the property whereas an infinite number of its prefixes do (prefixes ending with a).
Considering enforcement criteria (Def. 6.1 and 6.2) on persistence properties, it turns out that those persistence properties are in fact response properties. Proof A r-property becomes non-enforceable as soon as there exists a cycle of R-states from a P -state containing a P -state on its recognizing automaton (see Def. 6.2). Indeed, on a Streett automaton it allows infinite invalid execution sequences with an infinite number of valid prefixes. When removing this possibility on a Streett automaton, the constrained automaton can be easily translated to a response automaton. Indeed, on this constrained automaton, the states visited infinitely often are either all in P or P , that is:
On such automaton there is no difference between R-states and P -states. Consequently by retagging P -states to R, this automaton recognizes the same property. The retagged automaton is a response automaton. COROLLARY 6.1 Pure persistence are not enforceable:
Proof This is a direct consequence of Theorem 6.2. COROLLARY 6.2 Pure reactivity are not enforceable:
Proof This is a direct consequence of Corollary 6.1. A general reactivity property can be expressed as the composition of response and persistence properties. As a consequence, pure persistence properties are included in the set of reactivity properties. And consequently, the persistence part of a reactivity property is not enforceable. Proof Suppose that there exists an enforceable property which is not a response one. Then, according to the definition of the safety-progress hierarchy, this property would be a pure persistence or reactivity property. Consequently this property would not be enforceable.
COROLLARY 6.4 Enforceable properties are exactly response properties: EP Σ = Response(Σ).
Proof This is a direct consequence of Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.3.
Monitor synthesis
Now we show how it is possible to obtain a monitor either for verifying or enforcing a property. Generally speaking, a monitor is a device processing an input sequence of events or states in an incremental fashion. It is purposed to yield a property-specific decision according to its goal. In (classic) runtime verification such a decision is a truth-value taken from a truth-domain. This truth-value states an appraisal of property satisfaction or violation by the input sequence. For runtime enforcement, the monitor produces, a sequence of enforcement operations. The monitor uses an internal memory and applies enforcement operations to the input event and its current memory so as to modify input sequence and produce an output sequence. The relation between input and output sequence should follow enforcement monitoring constraints: soundness and transparency (Sect. 3.2).
In this section, we introduce two automaton transformations so as to obtain runtime verification and enforcement monitors from Streett automata. In the remainder, we consider a set of events Σ and a program P Σ . All transformations are shown in Fig. 2 so as the order of their use. The DFA2Streett(X) transformation is defined in [25] . From a regular finitary property ψ recognized by a Deterministic Finitestate Automaton (DFA) A ψ , it generates a Streett automaton (SA) A Π recognizing the r-property Π = (X f (ψ), X(ψ)), with X ∈ {A, E, R, P }. Then, one may want to optimize the Streett automaton A Π using Optim. For monitor generation, there are two possibilities. We use Streett2VM on A Π to obtain a Verification Monitor (VM) A ?Π verifying Π. We use Streett2EM on A Π to obtain an Enforcement Monitor (EM) A !Π enforcing Π.
Preliminaries on Streett automata
In the remainder, we consider a Streett m-automaton
Figure 2: Automaton transformations
Characterizing states of Streett automata. We will define monitors (for verification and enforcement) from Streett automata. To do so, we will define a set of subsets of Streett automaton states. The set
designate respectively the good (resp. presumably good, presumably bad, bad) states. The set P A is defined as follows:
Optimization of Streett automata. When a run on a Streett automaton reaches a state in Good or Bad , we know that all its future continuations will produce the same satisfaction verdict. With the aim of generating a monitor (of the smallest possible size), we can reduce the Good and Bad sets of states to respectively two states good and bad . The states good and bad are tagged as P or R following tags of states in Good and Bad (all states have the same tags). Then all transitions leading to a state in one of these sets is redirected to good or bad accordingly. The formal definition of this "optimization" is given as follows.
DEFINITION 7.1 (STREETT OPTIMIZATION) Given A and P A , we define the transformation
• −→ A is the smallest relation verifying: 
Monitors
A monitor is a procedure consuming events fed by an underlying program and producing an appraisal in the current state depending on the sequence read so far. For verification monitors, this output function gives a truth-value (a verdict) in B 4 regarding the evaluation of the current sequence relatively to the desired property. For enforcement monitors (EMs), this output function gives an enforcement operation inducing a modification on the input sequence so as to enforce the desired property. We first give a definition of monitors, this definition will be then specialized for verification and enforcement monitors. Considered monitors are deterministic finite-state machines producing an output in a relevant domain. This domain will be refined for special-purpose monitors (verification and enforcement). 
Synthesizing monitors for runtime verification
In the remainder, we consider monitorable r-properties Π, (φ, ϕ) ∈ MP Such monitors are independent from any specification formalism, and can be easily adapted to the specification formalism from which they can be generated. We define, the notion of verification sequence produced by a monitor and what it means to verify a property for a monitor. • The empty execution sequence is not verified, i.e. no verdict is produced while reading Σ . That is:
• An execution sequence a · σ is (incrementally) verified according to the transition fired by the input a: the input a is verified with the sequence read so far and produces a verdict b. Then the remaining sequence is verified. That is ∀q ∈ Q
• Then, the sequence σ is verified by A ? if it is verified from the initial state:
+ , s.t. the following constraints hold:
(1): the verification sequence b is produced by A ? ; (2) and (3): b correctness.
Using the set P AΠ of a Streett automaton A Π , we show how it is possible to obtain a verification monitor for the r-property Π.
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produces truth-values from states depending on the set
.1 (Correctness of Streett2VM) Π is verifiable on P Σ by a VM obtained by the application of Streett2VM. More formally, given A Π recognizing Π, we have:
Proof The proof of this theorem relies on the correctness of the computation performed while obtaining P AΠ for A Π .
Synthesizing monitors for runtime enforcement
In the remainder, we consider enforceable r-properties (φ, ϕ), Π ∈ EP Σ . An EM is producing enforcement operations (in Ops) depending on its current state.
DEFINITION 7.7 (ENFORCEMENT MONITOR)
An EM A ! is a 5-tuple (Q A ! , q init A ! , −→ A ! , Ops, Γ). Enforcement operations of Ops performed by the EM are aimed to operate a modification of the internal memory and potentially produce an output, i.e. each enforcement operation is a function: Σ×Σ * → Σ * ×Σ * . Then Γ : Q A ↓ → Ops is the output function, producing enforcement operations from states.
The considered enforcement operations allow enforcement monitors either to halt the target program (when the current input sequence irreparably violates the property), or to store the current event in a memory device (when a decision has to be postponed), or to dump the content of the memory device (when the target program went back to a correct behavior), or to switch off the monitor when all possible continuations of the current input sequence are correct wrt. the property under scrutiny 4 .
DEFINITION 7.8 (ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS)
We define a set of enforcement operations Ops = {halt, store, dump, off } as follows: ∀a ∈ Σ ∪ { Σ }, ∀m · Σ * . (a designates the input event of the monitor and m the memory device (its content).)
We define the transformation performed by an EM A ! while reading an input sequence σ ∈ Σ * and producing an output sequence o ∈ Σ * . • The empty sequence Σ is transformed into itself by A ! , i.e. ∀q ∈ Q A ! , ∀m ∈ Σ * , [[A ! ]]( Σ , q, m) = Σ . This is the case when the underlying program does not produce any event.
• An execution sequence a · σ is (incrementally) transformed according to the transition fired by the input a: the current memory content and the input a are applied to the enforcement operation of the arriving-state transition, it induces a new memory content and an output o. Fig. 3 is summarized the results of this paper, depicting the set of monitorable and enforceable properties wrt. the SP classification. Furthermore, we have given general synthesis procedures to generate runtime and enforcement monitors in this framework. Future works. The proposed approach raises new research perspectives and open questions. First, it seems interesting to consider this approach in the testing perspective. A monitor, from a broad view, (passively) observes the execution of the program. Notably it has no control on the produced events and their sequencing. In a testing context, the notion of controlable event is introduced. An interesting issue would be to characterize the set of testable properties in a fashion performed in this paper. Additional issue to take into consideration is to deal with a reduced observability on the system under scrutiny. In practical situations, the desired property may refer to events out of the observation scope of a monitor. Similarly, it seems interesting to see how it is possible to characterize the space of properties for which others runtime-verification derived techniques can be applied (e.g. runtime reflection [27] ). Another research perspective is to add expressiveness to EMs. Such augmented enforcers may enjoy more handling abilities on the sequences produced by the program. It seems interesting to see the impact on the set of enforceable properties. Also it seems relevant to study and compare complexity of the proposed monitors, notably with monitors defined in [3] for RV-LTL. To the authors' knowledge these are the only (runtime) monitors endowed with a 4-valued truth-domain.
